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English Devolution and the Covid-19 Pandemic:
Governing Dilemmas in the Shadow of the
Treasury
SAM WARNER, DAVID RICHARDS, DIANE COYLE AND
MARTIN J . SMITH
Abstract
This article explores the question of devolution in the light of the Covid-19 pandemic’s impact
on English local government. Criticism of the government’s handling of the crisis is wide-
spread and tends to focus on the highly centralised nature of the British state. Here, we attri-
bute the challenges faced by regional and local government in responding to the pandemic
primarily to the asymmetric nature of power relations that characterise financial planning
and control mechanisms, devised and overseen by the Treasury. We argue that the ongoing
crisis underlines the need for a democratic form of devolution—including further fiscal powers
for regional and local government—to support the economic recovery. In a context of increas-
ing fiscal uncertainty, the Treasury should seek to unlock the existing powers of local leaders
by reforming centralised budgetary constraints and taking accountability and monitoring
mechanisms closer to citizens.
Keywords: devolution, the Treasury, Covid-19, local government, metro mayors
Introduction
LOCAL GOVERNMENT has in many ways been the
success story of the UK’s response to the
Covid-19 pandemic. In challenging circum-
stances, local councils have shown how
place-specific knowledge and expertise,
adaptability and flexible delivery mechanisms
can, at least in part, make up for scarce
resources. Metro and city mayors have
enjoyed renewed visibility, albeit amid consid-
erable rancour with Whitehall. However, as
the medium to long-term fiscal landscape
becomes clearer, localities’ lack of financial
autonomy reinforces their dependency on cen-
tral government and hinders their ability to
plan for the future. In the absence of a mean-
ingful multi-year settlement in November
2020’s Spending Review, local leaders find
themselves operating in a fog of ever-present
financial uncertainty.
There is widespread concern about the
repeated blunders of government in response
to the pandemic.1 Despite English devolution,
local government has been left ill-equipped to
respond to the acute phase of the crisis or drive
the recovery. Paradoxically, for all the rhetoric
of local empowerment in recent years, the pro-
cess of English devolution has been captured
by Treasury orthodoxies concerning economic
management, financial control and perfor-
mance monitoring. This reflects the inherent
weaknesses of the UK’s political culture
bound up in the mythology surrounding the
Westminster model of government.2 Norma-
tive assumptions about parliamentary sover-
eignty, a strong executive and accountability
through a majoritarian electoral system and
ministerial responsibility bequeath a centra-
lised, power-hoarding model based on a set
of top-down, hierarchical governance arrange-
ments. This system is underpinned by a highly
1J. Gaskell, G. Stoker, W. Jennings and D. Devine,
‘Covid-19 and the blunders of our governments:
long-run system failings aggravated by political
choices’, The Political Quarterly, vol. 91, no. 3, 2020,
pp. 523–533.
2R. Rhodes, ‘Is Westminster dead in Westminster
(and why should we care)?’, inaugural lecture in
the ANZOG-ANU Public Lecture Series, The Shine
Dome, Academy of Science, 23 February 2005.
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complex, administrative landscape involving
a myriad of fragmented and overlapping pol-
icy deliverers on the ground. A combination
of centralisation and complexity limits the
capacity of local actors to respond to localised
challenges in bespoke ways.
The current circumstances offer a critical
moment, emerging from a growing consen-
sus on the need to reconfigure central-local
relations. Over the years, the Conservative
government’s vision of English devolution
has never been coherent, an issue com-
pounded by George Osborne’s departure
from office. The pandemic has revealed the
current model’s limitations, most notably
the constraints associated with financial
dependency on the centre. Nevertheless,
despite the challenges, local government’s
herculean efforts since March 2020 highlight
the considerable potential of English
devolution.
There is now a tangible case to re-think the
current model, forged in the Treasury’s image,
and challenge the deep-rooted pathologies
associated with existing governance arrange-
ments. Local actors need the capacity and
resources to innovate, take informed risks
and operate outside pre-ordained parameters.
If local government is to drive the economic
recovery, overcome regional inequalities
(‘levelling up’) and provide the public services
communities desperately need, the Treasury
will have to enable greater fiscal autonomy
whilst cascading accountability down to more
meaningful levels. Such an approach chal-
lenges the Treasury’s current centralised
notion of accountability and its own policy
activism. The change is necessary if govern-
ment is to be seen to be serious about democ-
racy at the local level and break the political
impasse surrounding governance reform in
the UK.
The constraints of the ‘devolution
revolution’
Traditionally, Whitehall has dominated eco-
nomic and social policy making, leaving the
English regions heavily dependent on the
centre for policy direction and financial and
operational capacity. The 2015 ‘devolution
revolution’, spearheaded by then Chancellor
of the Exchequer, George Osborne, purported
to transform central-local relations, catalyse
economic growth and tackle England’s wors-
ening regional inequalities. Under the banner
of the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ and, latterly,
the ‘Midlands Engine’, the Treasury and the
then Department for Communities and Local
Government (DCLG), alongside regional and
local actors, talked up the ‘bespoke’ nature of
city deals, stressing their potential to reflect
local priorities in areas like housing, trans-
port, skills and business support, among
others. Pragmatism, they argued, was prefer-
able to a more prescriptive or formulaic
approach, with the process of English devo-
lution thus being driven by example, not
imposition. In metro and city mayors, a new
layer of accountability was supposed to
ensure that the buck stopped with local
leaders, not remote bureaucrats in Whitehall.
Value for money, the Treasury’s bread and
butter, was said to be better protected as
public services would be delivered more effi-
ciently and effectively.
Beyond the rhetoric, though, this model of
devolution betrays the Treasury’s centralis-
ing tendencies and leaves the constitutional
subordination of English local government
intact. Continuing centralised control is
exemplified by local government’s financial
dependency on the centre. Traditionally, the
majority of its spending power comes from
central grants, though this has shifted some-
what over the last decade. Offering retention
of 50 per cent of business rates locally prom-
ised some enhanced autonomy. The Localism
Act (2011) introduced the option to hold a
referendum to increase local council tax
above centrally prescribed limits, although
to date no local authority has done so,
despite increasing pressure on the public ser-
vices they provide. The previous govern-
ment’s proposals to provide new powers to
allow local authorities to cut business rates
have been shelved; they are still set centrally.
Business rate retention is intended to offer
incentives for local leaders to pursue growth,
but is enveloped in a complex compensatory
‘tariff and top-up’ system designed to ensure
that regional funding disparities do not sig-
nificantly widen. Since centrally calculated
‘baseline’ funding levels have not been
re-set since 2013/14, the Treasury’s strategy
with respect to how the combination of
incentives and equalisation mechanisms will
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interact to address entrenched inequalities is
unclear.3
This is a classic wicked problem with no
simple answer. The amount raised through
business rates and council tax, both of which
can and do fluctuate, does not fully offset what
local authorities have lost in central grants.
There has been a transfer of risk to localities.
Moreover, as local authorities in deprived
areas raise less revenue from council tax, they
tend to lose out compared to previous arrange-
ments, despite the complex balancing formu-
lae.4 Tinkering with the spending power of
local authorities through council tax rates,
including the centre stipulating what the
money should be spent on, does not address
this problem. Similarly, as there is no local dis-
cretion over setting business rates, Treasury
officials’ claims about enhanced fiscal powers
ring hollow. Ministers and officials have not
addressed these fundamental dilemmas, but
instead have chosen ad hoc remedies that risk
reinforcing existing pathologies and essen-
tially leave local funding under central control.
An assessment of the new regional gover-
nance structures of English devolution confirms
this view. The Treasury has promoted an eco-
nomic model strongly favouring private sector-
led investment and growth as the path to
improvedprosperity. Governance arrangements
reflect this landscape, with local business leaders
given a seat at thedecision-making table through
Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEP). When
devising the deals, the Treasury effectively
shaped the nature of policy networks from the
centre by controlling resources, reinforcing cen-
trally defined priorities and framing the ‘rules
of the game’.5 The original Greater Manchester
Combined Authority agreement included the
stipulation that funding arrangements remained
subject to national priorities regarding fiscal con-
solidation. ‘Extensive’ evaluation work and evi-
dence of satisfactory performance determines
future tranches of five-yearly financing. This is
not unique to the Manchester deal. The notion
of ‘robust evaluation’, cost-benefit analysis and
departmental accounting officer sign-off are con-
sistent features of devolution deals across
England and reflect Treasury priorities.6
English devolution promotes a contradictory
set of governance arrangements. Regional and
local government have been formally released
from a range ofmechanisms of centralised over-
sight, but remain constrained in practice by the
realities of a restrictive fiscal environment. Since
2010, government has become less concerned
with operational and performance measure-
ments, reflected in the abolition of Public Service
Agreements and the Audit Commission. Yet,
the Treasury has tightened its grip on financial
control as part of its commitment to deficit
reduction. Local government must navigate
the challenges associated with responsibility
for delivering frontline services in some of the
most complex and challenging areas of public
policy,whilst satisfying its statutory duty to bal-
ance the books. Top-down accountability has
increasingly focussed on financial conformance,
as crudefinancial levers designed to keep a tight
rein on public expenditure consistently trump
concerns surrounding policy outcomes.7
An evolving system of financial monitoring,
outlined by Melanie Dawes, former Perma-
nent Secretary at DCLG, to the Public
Accounts Committee, included: close over-
sight of priorities; powers of intervention;
and mechanisms to ensure sub-national gov-
ernment operated in accordance with Manag-
ing Public Money—the Treasury’s handbook
on the management of public funds—before
any allocations aremade.8 The rules governing
infrastructure investment, codified in the
3This discussion is informed by M. Sandbrook,
‘Reviewing and reforming local government
finance’, Briefing Paper 07538, London, House of
Commons, August 2020.
4T. Harris, L. Hodge and D. Phillips, English Local
Government Funding: Trends and Challenges in 2019
and Beyond, London, Institute for Fiscal Stud-
ies, 2019.
5D. Bailey and M. Wood, ‘The metagovernance of
English devolution’, Local Government Studies,
vol. 43, no. 6, 2017, pp. 966–991.
6S. Ayres, M. Flinders and M. Sandford, ‘Territory,
power and statecraft: understanding English devo-
lution’, Regional Studies, vol. 52, no. 6, 2018, p. 859.
7L. Ferry and P. Eckersley, ‘Budgeting and govern-
ing for deficit reduction in the UK public sector: act
three “accountability and audit arrangements”’,
Public Money and Management, vol. 35, no. 3, 2015,
pp. 203–210.
8Public Accounts Committee, Oral evidence: Wave
1 City Deals, HC395, 16 September 2015, Q53 and
Q82; http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/
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Treasury’s Green Book, have been captured by
principles of agglomeration—that economic
activity clusters around urban areas—and
place demonstrable ‘economic returns’ above
a broader set of concerns, including social
need. This has served to reinforce regional dis-
parities and puts the emphasis on city regions
in existing devolution deals. There has been
some acknowledgment of the flaws in the
Treasury’s methodologies, both through revi-
sions to the Green Book and a renewed focus
on an industrial strategy, although, to date, it
has proved challenging to provide ‘objective
evidence’ of the broader dynamic effects of
potential infrastructure projects, leaving the
status quo largely intact.9
The current structure offinancing formayors’
offices and combined authorities, primarily
involving centrally managed funds, leaves
metro mayors as the figureheads of ‘grant coali-
tions’ at the mercy of central policy priorities
rather than autonomous regional actors with
executive power. Their powers are often shared
with other public bodies and theymust conform
to financial practices devised in Whitehall or
risk being frozen out of funding opportunities
governed by an institutionalised ‘bid culture’.10
They are effectively the delivery arm of White-
hall. The danger is that the government’s use
of competitive central grants strays close to a
form of ‘pork barrel’ politics. Investigations into
the allocation of the Towns Fund, a central fund
to tackle regional inequalities, found that sixty
of the sixty-one areas selected for support by
ministers were in Conservative marginals.11
The Levelling Up Fund, a £4.8 billion fund
announced at the November 2020 Spending
Review to invest in local infrastructure, has
attracted similar criticism. The priority allocation
groups, supposedly designed to reflect need, are
questionably weighted in favour of Conserva-
tive-held areas.12 This is a concerning trend.
The structures outlined in this section high-
light long-held suspicions that central govern-
ment does not trust the competence of local
government, a fact that has been flagged as a
reason for the near constant policy reinvention
associatedwith theUK systemof government.13
However, interview evidence shows a good
deal of satisfaction among local leaders with
the Treasury’s approach, often driven by a
desire to gain new powers and enhance existing
local cooperation. Compromises are aplenty—
local leaders in Greater Manchester did not
want a mayor, for example—but the opportu-
nity presented by an active advocate for English
devolution at the helm of the Treasury was too
good an opportunity to pass up. Trust only goes
so far and the Treasury has still set the parame-
ters of the deals. Despite this, a number of local
leaders have characterised a deal as the quickest
route to more autonomy in a context of inevita-
ble cuts, even if it is one stop on a much longer
devolution journey.14 Concerns persist over
the extent to which decision making remains
informal and has taken place behind closed
doors. This form of ‘elite co-option’ leaves Trea-
sury and Ministry of Housing, Communities
and Local Government (MHCLG) officials free
to negotiate with favoured local leaders. Other
stakeholders and the public more generally are
frozen out of the process.15
committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/public-
accounts-committee/wave-one-city-deals/oral/
21665.html (accessed 28 November 2020).
9D. Coyle and M. Sensier, ‘The imperial treasury:
appraisal methodology and regional economic per-
formance in the UK’, Regional Studies, vol. 54,
no. 3, 2020, pp. 283–295.
10M. Sandford, ‘Money talks: The finances of
English combined authorities’, Local Economy,
vol. 34, no. 2, 2019, pp. 106–122.
11E. Webber, ‘Robert Jenrick ignored civil servants
to spend Towns Fund millions in Tory marginals’,
Times, 24 September 2020; https://www.thetimes.
co.uk/article/robert-jenrick-ignored-civil-servants-
to-spend-towns-fund-millions-on-tory-marginals-
9l50g32t8 (accessed 4 December 2020).
12A. Bounds and A. Smith, ‘Levelling Up Fund bias
in favour of Tory seats “pretty blatant”’, Financial
Times, 5 March 2021; https://www.ft.com/
content/d485da2a-5778-45ae-9fa8-ca024bc8bbcf?
shareType=nongift (accessed 5 March 2021).
13E. Norris and R. Adam, ‘All change: why Britain is
so prone to policy reinvention, and what can be
done about it’, London, Institute for Govern-
ment, 2012.
14D. Kenealy, ‘A tale of one city: the devo Manc deal
and its implications for English devolution’, The
Political Quarterly, vol. 87, no. 4, pp. 572–581;
S. Ayres, M. Flinders and M. Sandford, ‘Territory,
power and statecraft: understanding English devo-
lution’, Regional Studies, vol. 52, no. 6, 2018, p. 855
and p. 860.
15D. Richards and M. J. Smith, ‘Devolution in
England, the British political tradition and the
absence of consultation, consensus and
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The ‘purpose’ of English devolution as it
stands is at cross purposes and contradictory.
The Treasury advocates city regions taking
control of their own affairs, whilst creating a
fiscal environment in which autonomy is lim-
ited and policy innovation is difficult. It passes
responsibility down without suitable lines of
accountability between local leaders and their
constituents, and without adequate resources
or revenue raising powers. It creates further
complexity, fragmentation and confusion in
local governance structures whilst simulta-
neously attempting to have devolution on the
cheap. The current model of English devolu-
tion shrouds the inadequacies of the status
quo associated with the Westminster model,
a position exemplified by central and local
government’s response to the Covid-19
pandemic.
Local government and the Covid-19
pandemic
The stringent nature of financial conformance
shaped by the Treasury restricts local govern-
ment, exacerbating the challenges associated
with the acute phase of the crisis, and leaving
it ill-equipped and constrained in its efforts to
drive recovery. Research by the Institute for
Government found that, across a range of pub-
lic services, underinvestment had undermined
resilience and meant that the capacity to meet
the needs of citizens had been compromised
whilst standards had declined. Moreover,
staffing pressures left many local authorities
stretched from day one of the pandemic.16
The Institute for Public Policy Research high-
lights that real-terms cuts to public health
grants, used by local authorities to fund pre-
ventative treatment services and improve local
health outcomes, were three times higher in
the North East than the South East, the most
pronounced of unequal allocations nation-
ally.17 This forms part of an emerging body
of work that demonstrates how health
inequalities and unequal central grant alloca-
tion have contributed to worse outcomes from
Covid-19.
Entering the pandemic, then, the founda-
tions were already shaky. This problem was
compounded by the government’s lacklustre
response. The Public Accounts Committee
recorded being ‘astonished’ by the lack of pre-
paredness for the economic impact of the cri-
sis, among other failings. Most importantly,
despite local budgets being under severe pres-
sure, the committee concluded that central
government was not making sufficient funds
available.18 Not only had restrictive financial
controls forced localities to become the front-
line deliverers of the austerity agenda, but
their financial dependency on the centre paral-
ysed them in their response to the pandemic as
the Treasury’s preference for the use of discre-
tionary grants lacked pace and precision. For
example, as care homes became the epicentre
of the crisis, local authorities were left waiting
for resources to trickle down from Whitehall.
Relatedly, the pandemic has drawn atten-
tion to significant information asymmetries
that work against the Treasury and undermine
the effectiveness of government policies. The
Institute for Fiscal Studies argues that poor
quality, often out-dated data led to an over-
general assessment of needs when allocating
emergency grants to local authorities early in
the pandemic. This task, which was acknowl-
edged to be ‘near impossible’within the exist-
ing system, could have been improved by
enabling councils to borrow and then be reim-
bursed at a later date.19 This would have
allowed for more place-specific responses.
Recently, the Treasury has also been forced to
intervene to outlaw the risky investment prac-
tices of cash strapped local authorities, namely
taking advantage of the low interest rates
offered by the Public Works Loan Board to
partake in property speculation, as numerous
examples have begun to unravel as a result of
ongoing market uncertainty caused by the
consideration’, Representation, vol. 51, no. 4, 2015,
pp. 385–401.
16N. Davies, G. Atkins, B. Guerin and S. Sodhi,
‘How fit were public services for coronavirus?’,
London, Institute for Government, 2020.
17C. Thomas, A. Round and S. Longlands, ‘Levelling
up for health prosperity’, Manchester, IPPR
North, 2020.
18Public Accounts Committee, Whole of Government
Response to Covid-19, Thirteenth Report, House of
Commons HC404, London, HMSO, 2020, p. 3
and p. 7.
19D. Phillips, ‘How much emergency coronavirus
funding are different councils in England receiving?
And is the funding allocation sensible?’, London,
Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2020.
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pandemic.20 That such interventions are neces-
sary illustrates the fragility of some aspects of
local government’s financial practices.
In April 2020, as the crisis unfolded, the
Chair of the Local Government Association
(LGA), James Jamieson, informed theHousing,
Communities and Local Government Select
Committee that the government’s £3.2 billion
emergency support packagewas ‘three or even
four times’ short ofwhatwas required. Bymid-
November, funding had been increased
through a range of support packages totalling
around £6 billion. Local leaders estimated a
shortfall in the region of £1 billion for 2020
and over £4 billion for the next financial year.21
The November 2020 Spending Review
settlement—announcing an estimated increase
in core spending power of 4.5 per cent—does
not end the uncertainty. The bulk of the
resources will come from hefty council tax
rises, with local authorities given the green
light for increases of 5 per cent (2 per cent in
council tax and a further 3 per cent adult social
care precept).22 This will keep the wolves from
the doors, but also presents a range of prob-
lems associated with existing inequalities and
the considerable financial pressures many
people face.
Across the sector, local leaders are being
forced—once again—to make difficult deci-
sions about where the axe should fall.
Recently, James Jamieson informed the Public
Accounts Committee that the ‘well-renowned
lower-hanging fruit had long gone’. Whilst
the acute phase of the crisis has presented
unparalleled challenges, he argued, this is
nothing compared to what is down the track
for local government if its finances are not
secured in the medium to long term. As local
authorities must balance their books and have
limited revenue raising or borrowing powers,
further cuts to non-essential (but nevertheless
important) services will follow. The perversity
of this situation is that preventative services,
such as early intervention work to support
children, families and the elderly, will be tar-
geted, a situation he describes as a ‘false
economy’.
Aswith the 1980s, the spectre of local govern-
ment bankruptcies has re-emerged, Croydon
being the most notable example. The Chartered
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy
has discouraged councils from making
Section 114 applications under the Local Gov-
ernment Finance Act (1988) if their financial dif-
ficulties stem directly from the pandemic. Such
notices, issued by the Chief Finance Officer
when they believe expenditure in a financial
year is likely to exceed resources, prohibits
new expenditure for any purpose outside a
local authority’s statutory duties. Discussions
over a programme of capitalisations across the
sector, allowing for capital budgets to be used
to fund day-to-day spending, have commenced
between a number of councils andMHCLG.23 It
remains to be seen how effective these negotia-
tions are. Nevertheless, the Treasury’s decision
to ignore calls for a meaningful multi-year set-
tlement further binds the hands of local leaders.
Local authorities are complex organisations
operating in an increasingly fragmented envi-
ronment. Without financial certainty, their
choices—and the resulting outcomes for service
users—are often intolerable.
Meaningful investment is only part of the
solution. Strategic leadership, innovation and
the cross-fertilisation of ideas is needed at the
best of times, and even more so during a crisis.
George Osborne commented that he believed
metro mayors had ‘come of age’ as the voice
of their regions during the pandemic.24 This
was a reference to the new-found visibility of
figures like Andy Burnham in the autumn of20HM Treasury, Public Works Loan Board: Future
Lending Terms, London, HMSO, p. 3.
21Housing, Communities and Local Government
Committee, Oral evidence: The Work of the Department,
HC302, 27 April 2020, Q1; https://committees.
parliament.uk/oralevidence/304/html/; Housing,
Communities and Local Government Committee,
Oral evidence: The Spending Review and Local Govern-
ment Finance, HC924, 12 November 2020, Q2;
https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/
1206/html/ (both accessed 7 December 2020).
22HM Treasury, Spending Review 2020, London,
HMSO, 2020.
23Housing, Communities and Local Government
Committee, Oral Evidence: The Spending Review and
Local Government Finance, HC924, 12 November
2020, Q5; https://committees.parliament.uk/
oralevidence/1206/html/ (accessed 7 December
2020).
24G. Osborne, Newscast, 22 October 2020; https://
www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/p08w2p43
(accessed 3 December 2020).
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2020, as they battled Whitehall for resources
when regional restrictions were tightened
across the north of England. There was a brief
but palpable sense that regional mayors had
real power to influence Whitehall. But
Osborne’s assessment seems premature when
local leaders remain largely frozen out of the
policy-making process. These fractious events,
accelerating a deterioration in central-local
relations, have conditioned the government’s
subsequent behaviour. As England emerged
from a second national lockdown in
November 2020, uniform rules were pre-
scribed from the centre meaning that poten-
tially embarrassing regional negotiations
were avoided.
With reference to current funding arrange-
ments, Andy Burnham recently described the
status quo as ‘begging-bowl devolution,
where we constantly go on bended knee’ ask-
ing for money.25 Mayors can provide strategic
leadership, but have struggled to catalyse a
rapid response without resources. They were
intended to be accountable, visible spokesper-
sons for their regions and it remains to be seen
how the role develops as the pandemic reveals
different interpretations. Andy Burnham has
been relatively high profile and enjoyed con-
siderable media attention. Andy Street, metro
mayor of the West Midlands, despite being
far from uncritical of the government during
the pandemic, claims to be ‘less inclined to
rush to the microphone’, instead preferring to
pick up the phone to Whitehall.26 Forming
part of a worrying trend, like negotiations sur-
rounding lockdowns, the Levelling Up Fund
increases the prominence of local MPs relative
to local leaders. Local authorities are expected
to consult MPs when devising a bid, even if
their support is not a necessary condition of
success.27 In the current context, mayors
remain important regional figureheads capa-
ble of bringing together various stakeholders
to achieve particular priorities but, as Covid-
19 demonstrates, their potential is unfulfilled
and their power severely limited, in large part
as a result of their financial subordination.
What next for the Treasury and
devolution?
The process of English devolution is at a cross-
roads. A Fair Funding Review is underway,
but its report has been delayed to avoid further
disruption during the pandemic. The long-
promised White Paper on English devolution
has been pushed back for an unspecified
period and the business rates review won’t
report until the autumn. Still, an opportunity
presents itself to empower, once and for all,
actors at the local level and shake up central-
local relations. Local leaders need real power
to shape outcomes and take decisions
informed by their regional expertise and
knowledge. This does not mean being aban-
doned by the centre, but being trusted to act
in the interests of the communities they serve.
We contend that throughout the process of
English devolution, the Treasury has acted to
reinforce rather than challenge the core tenets
of theWestminster model. Thismodel of devo-
lution, however, may well have run out of
road. In its evidence to the 2020 Spending
Review, the LGA argued for the traditional
model of departmental spending to be
replaced with ‘a degree of fiscal decentralisa-
tion in line with some of the world’s most pro-
ductive economies’. Crucially, the document
cautions against piecemeal reforms, as a
place-based approach to fiscal devolution can-
not be achieved by attempting to ‘fit new and
bold ideas into old frameworks’.28
By giving primacy to its traditional finance
ministry role, the Treasury has neglected the
bigger picture. The Treasury’s approach to
English devolution favours a particular eco-
nomic model that cannot be said to have a
25Select Committee onEconomicAffairs,Corrected oral
evidence: Employment and Covid-19, 27 October
2020; https://committees.parliament.uk/oral
evidence/1109/pdf/ (accessed 15 November 2020).
26S. Bloomfield, ‘Has Britain’s second largest city
reached breaking point?’, The Guardian,




27HM Treasury, Ministry of Housing Communities
and Local Government and Department for
Transport, Levelling Up Fund: Prospectus, London,
HMSO, 2021, p. 7.
28Local Government Association, Comprehensive
Spending Review 2020 Submission, 29 September
2020; https://www.local.gov.uk/publications/re-
thinking-public-finances (accessed 25 Novem-
ber 2020).
ENGLISHDEVOLUTION AND THECOVID-19 PANDEMIC: GOVERNINGDILEMMAS IN THE SHADOWOF THE TREASURY 7
© 2021 The Authors. The Political Quarterly published by JohnWiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Political
Quarterly Publishing Co (PQPC).
The Political Quarterly
clean track record as a decade of secular stag-
nation pre-dates the Covid-19 pandemic. The
Treasury’s reform of the Green Book is a wel-
come development in addressing regional
imbalances, although its new emphasis on
investment decisions being consistent with
the government’s strategic direction refers to
central government priorities. Nonetheless,
the scale of investment being proposed prom-
ises to be inadequate relative to the needs. Fur-
thermore, there are serious questions to be
asked about how regional infrastructure
spending is distributed so as to put local
leaders in the driving seat. To challenge the
norms governing Treasury thinking, White-
hall needs to embrace England’s cities and
regions as a dynamic system, not view them
in isolation. Moving Treasury officials to Dar-
lington, butmoving the newUK Infrastructure
Bank to Leeds and parts of the MHCLG to
Wolverhampton is likely to add to coordina-
tion problems. It does not indicate a change
of mindset or the devolution of power, but
instead, provides further evidence of the con-
tinuing strength of the centre.
Recent reappraisals of the Treasury have
highlighted its tendency to exert ‘over-control’
as an obstacle to greater devolution.29 The
Treasury in many respects is the most power-
ful policy actor through its control of the purse
strings and ability to shape the rules of finan-
cial management. This is problematic on a
number of levels. First, as the difficulties asso-
ciated with the early support packages to local
authorities illustrate, compared to local
leaders and public service providers, the Trea-
sury lacks specific knowledge of local priori-
ties and circumstances. Second, its power in
negotiations does not stem from its policy
knowledge, but from the dominance it enjoys
in Whitehall and beyond, owing to its role as
custodian of the public finances. This power
makes it essentially a veto player, blocking ini-
tiatives rather than enabling innovation and
informed risk taking. Third, the failure to pro-
mote holistic, joined-up solutions adequately
at the local levelmeans that savings in one area
often lead to costs being pushed elsewhere,
resulting in suboptimal outcomes. Fourth, the
Treasury’s economics and finance ministry
roles can conflict, to the detriment of strategic
decision making and effectiveness. This was
an issue recognised by theWilson government
over fifty years ago when creating the Depart-
ment for Economic Affairs, and more recently
in the now abandoned industrial strategy.
A serious conversation needs to commence
about fiscal devolution in order to end the
dependency of local government on the centre.
This might be controversial in Whitehall, and
it is of course no panacea, but it is necessary
if localities are to gain the autonomy needed
to respond rapidly to the needs of the citizens
they serve, to innovate and to drive true
efficiencies. The LGA Chair, again, spoke can-
didly about the future of financial manage-
ment, arguing that in a more decentralised
economy, local government will be able to
deliver better public service outcomes for resi-
dents.30 There are legitimate concerns that
some local authorities could find themselves
further restricted as regional inequalities
widen. Careful consideration of such issues,
aided by widening the pool of participants
involved in the conversation, will go some
way to overcoming these very real challenges.
The debate is sometimes framed in terms of a
binary choice between national standards for
spending and services, or local fiscal auton-
omy. This is a false dichotomy as it overlooks
the potential for greater local financial auton-
omy to reshape the terrain by more strategic
decisionmaking. This crisis has confirmed that
local government possesses leadership
strengths, but lacks effective capacity. Fiscal
autonomy—including tax raising and borrow-
ing powers—will help by solving the problems
of short-termism associated with Treasury
funding settlements and sticking plaster finan-
cial management governed by conditionality.
The centre should target resources at pockets
of deprivation or long-term structural impedi-
ments to growth, but ultimately thriving
regional economies can only be built from the
bottom up.
Whitehall must trust local leaders to drive
change if public service providers are to be
29R. Kerslake, Rethinking the Treasury, independent
review commissioned by shadow Chancellor, John
McDonnell, February 2017.
30Housing, Communities and Local Government
Committee, Oral evidence: The Spending Review and
Local Government Finance, HC924, 12 November
2020, Q9; https://committees.parliament.uk/
oralevidence/1206/html/ (accessed 7 December
2020).
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empowered to respond to the bewilderingly
complex and fragmented governance land-
scape that has emerged in recent years. Devo-
lution decision making, therefore, should
foreground local information, expertise and
skills in financial management. It is about
more than responsibility for centrally allocated
funding streams. The Treasury’s focus needs
to be on ensuring a strong financial frame-
work, not determining how policy outcomes
at local level are achieved. The Treasury’s
new performance monitoring system, includ-
ing the Public Value Framework, has intuitive
appeal because its focusses on outcomes as an
aspect of the planning and control of public
expenditure.31 However, connecting ministers
to service users through existing hierarchical
structures may reinforce rather than challenge
existing tensions in the system. The jury
remains out.
Similarly, whilst greater focus on joined-up
working is welcome, within the confines of
existing accountability structures, the com-
plexity of the challenges may still prove
overwhelming. The £165 million Troubled
Families Fund for local authorities, for exam-
ple, is still administered by MHCLG in the
usual way, albeit in cooperation with the
Department for Education, Health and Social
Care, the Treasury and the Home Office. The
fact that the Treasury has affirmed the system
of departmental accounting officers suggests
that there is some way to go to win this argu-
ment. For devolution to work, a rethink of
the traditional notion that all accountability
runs through ministers is needed. Alternative
ways of building accountability between local
decision makers and communities are long
overdue. Clearer attribution of responsibility
would help, something that has become
increasingly obscured in recent years.
All of this points to the need to frame
English devolution differently amid the new
circumstances created by Covid-19. The basis
for this should be a democratic process driven
from the bottom up, connecting communities
with local leaders and encompassing consulta-
tion, consensus and consideration. Covid-19
provides an opportunity, however challeng-
ing, to pursue changes to the ways in which
we are governed. It will require a fundamental
re-set of the structures and attitudes governing
central-local relations, including the way local
public services are funded and investment
decisions made. If the regions of England are
to become the engines of the recovery, they
need to be released from financial dependency
on the centre. If fiscal devolution is to stand the
test of time, a serious rethink of constitutional
arrangements is required to ensure that hard-
wired centralising tendencies are overcome.
Meaningful reform cannot be layered on to
existing arrangements.
Conclusion: A new model
of devolution
The UK’s sluggish response to the Covid-19
pandemic has been alarming as governance
arrangements have been found wanting. The
Treasury was nimble and effective in its initial
response to the pandemic, but appears less
able to adapt to the systemic problems it has
revealed. No one is suggesting that the events
of recent months have not presented unprece-
dented challenges. However, a focus on local
government points clearly to a number of
entrenched structural impediments to a more
accomplished response. This is extremely seri-
ous because the financial constraints faced at
the regional and local level of government,
coming on the back of a decade’s worth of fis-
cal austerity, mean that while the acute phase
of the crisis may be over, the consequences
for local government in particular will persist
for some time.
Our argument is that the next phase of devo-
lution should not only empower local leaders
but also fundamentally reconfigure central-
local relations. This will necessarily involve
Whitehall generally, and the Treasury specifi-
cally, adopting an alternative approach to gov-
ernance to that of the Westminster model. The
public policy challenges thrown up by the
pandemic confirm that local leaders should
have the ability to respond quickly, but cannot
do so when operating in a context of restrictive
Treasury financial control. Narratives of evo-
lutionary change and adaptability associated
with the UK’s constitutional settlement look
archaic in the face of mounting ‘wicked prob-
lems’ that require serious national delibera-
tion, not quick fixes. The enduring economic
uncertainty created by Brexit adds to the31Treasury, Spending Review 2020, pp. 46–50.
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enormity of the challenge, but does not detract
from the need for reform. Commencing inclu-
sive discussions between policy makers and
local communities about greater fiscal auton-
omy and an enhanced role for metro and city
mayors would be an excellent starting point
to bring about meaningful change. A serious
debate about reforming the vertical account-
ability structures associated with ministerial
responsibility and forging horizontal struc-
tures to promote accountability lines between
local leaders and the communities they serve
is also needed.
Fundamentally, reform needs to challenge
a deeply embedded set of power asymme-
tries that have rendered local government
as agent for delivering fiscal consolidation
at the sub-national level. The Treasury’s his-
toric mission is to ensure value for money
and to protect the public finances. We see
no contradiction between this and a system
of governance that is preventative, communi-
cative and inclusive of a range of actors in
financial management locally. All the evi-
dence suggests that this will not only save
money but also deliver better outcomes for
citizens.
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